Tag Archives: deterrence

Offensive Cyber Capabilities: To What Ends?

Here’s the abstract of the paper I wrote with Herb Lin for Cycon X:

There is a growing interest in the use of offensive cyber capabilities (OCC) among states. Despite the growing interest in these capabilities, little is still known about the nature of OCC as a tool of the state. This research therefore aims to understand if (and how) offensive cyber capabilities have the potential to change the role of military power. Drawing on a wide range of cases, we argue that these capabilities can alter the manner in which states use their military power strategically in at least four ways. OCC are not particularly effective in deterring adversary military action, except when threatened to be used by states with a credible reputation. However, they do have value in compellence. Unlike conventional capabilities, the effects of offensive cyber operations do not necessarily have to be exposed publicly, which means the compelled party can back down post-action without losing face thus deescalating conflict. The potential to control the reversibility of effect of an OCC by the attacker may also encourage compliance. OCC also contribute to the use of force for defensivepurposes, as it could provide both a preemptive as well as preventive strike option. Finally, its symbolic value as a ‘prestige weapon’ to enhance ‘swaggering’ remains unclear, due to its largely non-material ontology and transitory nature.

Read the full paper here: https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/Art%2003%20Offensive%20Cyber%20Capabilities.%20To%20What%20Ends.pdf

 

Europe Slowly Starts to Talk Openly About Offensive Cyber Operations

Europe is finally starting to talk more publicly and candidly offensive cyber operations.

Two weeks ago, the Dutch Ministry of Defense hosted the Third International Cyber Operations Symposium. In conference hand-outs, the commander of Dutch Defense Cyber Command, Hans Folmer, said he hoped to “foster a shared and realistic understanding of the role of cyber capabilities in future operations, while facilitating the opportunity to develop and strengthen relationships among all participants.” One senior participant at the conference observed: “speaking at NATO about offensive cyber was blasphemy a few years ago. We have advanced.”

At the same conference last year, former UK Defense Minister Michael Fallon acknowledged that states “must have the capability to project power in cyberspace as in other domains” and confirmed that the United Kingdom was using “offensive cyber” against the self-declared Islamic State group. This year, participants discussed lessons learned from those operations, and explored how and when cyber tools could be the most useful against an adversary.

However, based on the discussions this year, there seemed to be less excitement about the potential of offensive cyber tools. In Europe, cyber capabilities were once seen as a silver bullet for Europe’s defense problems—chronically low defense budgets and outdated materiel could be replaced with an asymmetric capability that could improve Europe’s ability to deter adversaries and project power. Now, as one participant said, “cyber is no longer something special.” There was a more honest and open debate about how cyber capabilities can be used, the challenges with developing and maintaining them, and understanding their strategic effects.

Nevertheless, Europe will continue to struggle with at least three issues.

First, not all European cyber commands are created equal. In fact, the diversity of capability in Europe makes it difficult to compare them in theory, and probably even more difficult to coordinate efforts in practice. Whereas Germany is said to have thousands of ‘information and cyber officers’, you can count the people working at cyber defense units in other European countries on two hands. Also, all states are in need of technical personnel, but not all have the resources to attract them. Although many European countries started building a cyber offensive capability almost a decade ago, many states are still far away from a meaningful capability.

Second, Europe is still searching for a strategic objective for its offensive cyber capability. Every scholar or policymaker at the conference noted that deterrence was a flawed strategy to pursue in cyberspace—either partially or completely. Yet, there remains a lack of alternatives and policymakers at the conference seemed unaware of ideas raised in the academic literature about the strategic value of offensive cyber capabilities, such as Kello’s cumulative deterrence, Harknett’s notion of persistence, or Lindsay and Gartzke’s discussion of deception.

Third, Europe lacks a common doctrine on the use of offensive cyber operations. NATO recently finished a first draft of its own cyber operations doctrine, and is going through the process of addressing comments made by member states and invited observers. Europe will need a common doctrine, or at least a common lexicon that can be used by military planners, if it wants to take a coordinated approach to cyber operations. Doctrine normally tries to link theory and practice. Yet, cyber operations in a military context are still fairly new and the lack of practice means that policymakers tend to concentrate primarily on theory, making the development of doctrine a difficult exercise.

This article was first published on the Net Politics Blog of the Council on Foreign Relations